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Appellate Review of the Decision Whether or
Not to Empanel a Three-Judge
Federal Court
David P. Curriet
Revolutions, like screwdrivers, come in various sizes. The revolution I
mean to discuss is one of the smaller ones, even by Supreme Court
standards. Gradually and quite unobtrusively it has arrived just one
step short of completion. Lawyers ought to be aware of it, yet the
Court has done its best to pretend that nothing has happened.
When Congress in 1910 required the convening of an extraordinary
three-judge district court in suits to enjoin the enforcement of uncon-
stitutional state laws, it provided a direct appeal to the Supreme Court
from three-judge decisions granting or denying injunctions,1 but it
apparently gave no thought to the question of appellate review of the
decision whether or not three judges were required. The statute hav-
ing proved less than self-administering in this regard,2 the Court was
soon confronted with a number of requests for relief against the de-
cision of a single trial judge that three judges were not called for. The
Court devised a clear remedy: If a single judge granted or denied an
interlocutory injunction,3 entered a final judgment 4 or simply denied
a request for three judges and held the case for future disposition,5
there was no appeal either to the Supreme Court or to the Court of
Appeals, for the former was open only when three judges had heard
the case and the latter only if three judges were not required. The
frustrated litigant therefore was to seek a writ of mandamus from the
Supreme Court.0
t Professor of Law, The University of Chicago.
I Act of June 18, 1910, ch. 309, § 17, 36 Stat. 557 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1253 (direct
review), 2281 (three judges) (1964)). The same procedures were extended to suits attacking
federal statutes by Act of Aug. 24, 1937, ch. 754, § 3, 50 Stat. 752 (codified at 28 U.S.C.
§ 2282 (1964)).
2 See generally D. Currie, The Three-.judge District Court in Constitutional Litigation,
32 U. Cm. L. R v. 1 (1964).
3 Ex parte Metropolitan Water Co., 220 U.S. 539 (1911).
4 Ex parte Northern Pacific Ry., 280 U.S. 142 (1929).
5 Ex parte Bransford, 310 U.S. 354 (1940).
6 The argument was most plainly spelled out in Stratton v. St. Louis S.W. Ry., 282 U.S.
10 (1930), and in Ex parte Metropolitan Water Co., 220 U.S. 539 (1911).
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That this interpretation of the statute was correct is by no means
clear. In the first place, the statute seems to contemplate an appeal to
one or another court from any final judgment and from any order
granting or denying an interlocutory injunction.7 Second, the statute
literally seems to say that whether appeal is taken to the Supreme
Court or to the Court of Appeals depends on whether three judges
were required, not on whether three judges actually sat, and in any
event the statute does not suggest, as the Court did, that one court's
jurisdiction is determined by the former standard and the other's by
the latter. Third, if the Court was right that there was no appeal and
that mandamus accordingly was the right remedy, it is not obvious that
this writ should be sought in the first instance from the Supreme Court
rather than from the Court of Appeals. Yet there was something to
be said for the Supreme Court's initial interpretation. The appeal
framework was obviously designed with the merits in mind, and to
make the jurisdiction of the appellate court to determine whether
three judges are required turn on the merits of that question would
cause a waste of resources, as illustrated by the Idlewild case discussed
below. Finally, the All Writs statute authorizes federal courts to issue
mandamus only "in aid of their respective jurisdictions." Since cases
required to be heard by three judges come ultimately within the ap-
pellate purview of the Supreme Court and not of the Courts of Ap-
peals, only the Supreme Court's jurisdiction is aided by the grant of
mandamus to convene the special court.
Things went merrily along under this scheme for nearly forty years.
Then, in Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp. v. Epstein,9 a lone trial
judge abstained pending state-court resolution of issues in a case appro-
priate for three judges.10 An appeal was taken to the Court of Appeals,
which held that the decision to abstain was one that could be made
only by three judges, and therefore, in accord with the Supreme Court's
stated procedure, that the Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction to re-
view the decision." The trial judge viewed the Court of Appeals' state-
ment that three judges were required as dictum and refused again to
7 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 1292 (Courts of Appeals have jurisdiction over all final decisions
and over interlocutory orders granting or refusing injunctions, "except where a direct re-
view may be had in the Supreme Court"), § 1253 (appeal to Supreme Court from orders
granting or denying interlocutory or permanent injunctions in any suit "required . . . to
be heard and determined by a district court of three judges') (1964). The original statutes
were similar.
8 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (1964).
9 370 U.S. 713 (1962), remanding Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp. v. Rohan, 289 F.2d
426 (2d Cir. 1961).
1o Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp. v. Rohan, 188 F. Supp. 434 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
i1 Idlewild Eon Voyage Liquor Corp. v. Rohan, 289 F.2d 426 (2d Cir. 1961).
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call for a special court. 12 The Supreme Court was asked for certiorari
to review the Court of Appeals and for mandamus to require the con-
vening of three judges.
The Supreme Court studiously avoided saying anything relevant ex-
cept that three judges were in fact required. The brief opinion did cast
some cold water on the Court of Appeals' position, pointing out that
the principal precedent relied on by that court 3 had held only that a
Court of Appeals lacked power to review on the merits and had not
held the Court of Appeals "powerless ever to give any guidance when
a single judge has erroneously invaded the province of a three-judge
court."'14 This was true enough as to holding, 15 though the opinion had
very plainly said the sole remedy for the refusal to call three judges
was mandamus in the Supreme Court, and the Idlewild opinion, after
declaring precedent not decisive, stopped short of saying what the
powers of the Court of Appeals actually were. By no means did the
Court intimate that it was changing the law of appellate review.
Five years later the following memorandum appeared as the Supreme
Court's full opinion (apart from a one-line dismissal of the appeal) in
a case called Schachman v. Arnebergh:16
Appellants seek review by this Court of the refusal by the
District Court to convene a three-judge District Court pur-
suant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2281-2284. We have held that such
review is available in the Court of Appeals, Idlewild Bon
Voyage Liquor Corp. v. Epstein, 370 U.S. 713, and not in this
Court. Buchanan v. Rhodes, 385 U.S. 3.
This was interesting indeed. It was nice to know that Idlewild had up-
held the power of the Court of Appeals, since the Court in Idlewild
had not bothered telling us what it was doing. It was also interesting
to discover that a subsequent decision had held the Supreme Court
could no longer review the refusal to convene three judges, for that
meant that somewhere along the line the Court had overruled forty
years of precedents without ever saying a word about it.
Buchanan v. Rhodes,'17 on which the Court relied in dismissing the
Schackman appeal, is a shorter opinion than Schackman itself: "The
motion to dismiss is granted and the appeal is dismissed for want of
12 194 F. Supp. 3 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
13 Stratton v. St. Louis S.W. Ry., 282 U.S. 10 (1930).
14 370 U.S. 713, 716 (1962).
15 The single district judge in Stratton v. St. Louis S.V. Ry., 282 U.S. 10 (1930), had
dismissed on the merits; the Court of Appeals had ordered him to grant the injunction;
the Supreme Court reversed and sent the case back for trial before three judges.
1o 387 U.S. 427 (1967).
17 385 U.S. 3 (1966).
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jurisdiction." Such a disposition is scarcely calculated to inform the
Bar of a sweeping change in appellate procedure, but there it is. Pre-
sumably we are expected to have divined this switch from reading
Idlewild, for that decision, as we were later to be told for the first time
in Schackman, held that the Court of Appeals could review the denial
of three judges. It was after all only because the Courts of Appeals
lacked that power that the Supreme Court had earlier said mandamus
was available; affirming the power of the Courts of Appeals therefore
removed a necessary prop from the argument for Supreme Court re-
view. This projection would not have been too much to expect the
lawyers to make if the Court had not gone to such lengths in Idlewild
to pretend it was saying nothing new about the powers of the Courts
of Appeals.
The lower-court opinion in Buchanan18 reveals that the trial judge
had dismissed a suit to reapportion state judgeships on the dual
grounds that the controversy was political and that the complaint
failed to state a claim on which relief could be granted. Thus the Su-
.preme Court seems finally to have rejected the untenable distinction
drawn by the Second Circuit in Idlewild, which allowed the Court of
Appeals to review a single-judge dismissal for lack of jurisdiction but
not a single-judge dismissal on the merits.19 After Buchanan, it seems,
the Court of Appeals is to review any appealable judgment entered by
* a single judge, and to order a special court convened if the judge erred
in not calling for one.20
The Court's statement in Schackman is broader still, purporting to
allow Court of Appeals review of any "refusal . . . to convene" the
special court. The trial judge's opinion, however,21 shows that as in
both Idlewild and Buchanan the district judge had entered an appeal-
able order, this time a dismissal apparently on the basis that no sub-
stantial federal question was presented. Thus it might be premature
to take the Schackman statement at face value; the Court was not there
called on to decide whether or not it still had authority to issue man-
damfis to a trial judge who refused to call for two colleagues and who
had not entered an appealable judgment.
The Supreme Court's next helpful pronouncement on this subject
18 249 F. Supp. 860 (N.D. Ohio 1966).
19 See the discussion in D. Currie, supra note 2, at 66-73.
20 This position can be recondled with the statutes by coupling the position in, Stratton
v. St. Louis S.W. Ry., 282 U.S. 10 (1930), that direct appeal to the Supreme Court is con-
templated only when three judges have passed on the merits, with the evident statutory
command that all final judgments, and orders respecting interlocutory injunctions are
appealable.
21 258 F. Supp. 983 (C.D. Cal. 1966).
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was its one-paragraph memorandum in Wilson v. City of Port Lavaca,2
in which a three-judge court had held itself unnecessary and the relief
sought "unwarranted," and the original judge had adopted the panel
decision as its own. Despite the once-relevant fact that the three-judge
court had rendered a final decision, the Supreme Court said it thought
the case was the same as those in which, as in Idlewild, Buchanan, and
Schackman, a single judge had refused to call his brethren and had
denied relief: ". . . an appeal lies to the appropriate United States
Court of Appeals, and not to this Court."
The latest straw is Mengelkoch v. Industrial Welfare Commission.23
A three-judge court had dissolved itself on finding the constitutional
issue insubstantial. The same day the original district judge had en-
tered a final judgment dismissing the suit so that a state court could
determine the remaining issue of the compatibility of state law with
a federal statute. Still the Supreme Court refused to hear a direct
appeal: The single judge's final judgment could be taken to the Court
of Appeals, as was more or less clear after Schackman; moreover, the
Court cited Wilson, "we have held that when, as here, a three-judge
court dissolves itself for want of jurisdiction, an appeal lies to the ap-
propriate Court of Appeals and not to this Court." 24 It was immaterial,
a footnote added, that in Wilson the single judge had "actually adopted
the opinion of the three-judge court as his own."25
What was new about Mengelkoch was that the decision of the three-
judge panel dissolving itself was not itself final or otherwise appeal-
able. In all the preceding cases upholding the power of the Court of
Appeals, the order challenged had been appealable; in Wilson, the
only prior decision concerning the order of a three-judge court, the
three judges had dismissed the case on the merits. The jump was easy
in Mengelkoch, for the single judge's final order dismissing the action
had been entered on the same day as the order dissolving the special
court; the Supreme Court could well have concluded there was no
need for the extraordinary writ of mandamus to review the dissolu-
tion since the request for three judges could be immediately reviewed
by the Court of Appeals on appeal from the dismissal order.
Yet the language of Mengelkoch, as well as the broad language of
the earlier Schackman decision, raises the additional question whether
or not the Supreme Court still possesses the authority to issue man-
damus to require the convening of three judges when there has been
22 391 U.S. 352 (1968).
23 393 US. 83 (1968).
24 Id. at 83-84,
25 Id. at 84.
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no appealable judgment. This issue can arise in two ways: A single
judge may simply refuse a request for three judges, or a three-judge
panel may dissolve itself, in both cases leaving the case pending for
further disposition before,a single judge. In these cases no appeal lies
to either the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals; if there is a
remedy it is by way of mandamus under the All Writs Act.2 6 The
language of Schackman and of Mengelkoch suggests that mandamus in
these situations should now be sought in the Courts of Appeals, and
Chief Judge Brown of the Fifth Circuit, without reciting the de-
cisions, assumes that this is so.2 7 This interpretation would be in total
accord with the Supreme Court's tendency from Idlewild onward to
shift the burden of determining the need for three judges onto the
Courts of Appeals. But, of course, this interpretation is contrary to the
forty years of practice prior to Idlewild, when the proper remedy was
mandamus from the Supreme Court,28 and it is not easy to show, as
section 1651 requires, how mandamus would be in aid of the jurisdic-
tion of the Court of Appeals, which is ousted from jurisdiction by the
empanelling of three judges. The First Circuit, after Schackman but
before Mengelkoch, had adhered to the traditional view that only the
Supreme Court can review the need for three judges before the entry
of an appealable order.29
Some day a new statute may make it clear which orders in three-
judge cases are reviewable in which courts.30 As in most procedural
matters, it is less important that the question be settled right than that
it be settled one way or the other, but because the Supreme Court has
better things to do I should prefer to see the power to determine the
need for three judges lodged in the Courts of Appeals. The Supreme
Court is certainly moving in this direction. So far the new law seems
more in accord with the statutes than does the old, as well as less waste-
ful; I have no objection to overruling bad decisions, but I do think it
would be nice for the Court in overruling a long-established procedure
26 The decisions, e.g., Ex parte Bransford, 310 U.S. 354 (1940), assume the availability
of the writ in such cases without mention of the familiar notion that mandamus lies only
to correct "an abuse of judicial power," not when trial courts have "erred in ruling on
matters within their jurisdiction." See Will v. United States, 389 U.S. 90 (1967); Bankers
Life & Cas. Co. v. Holland, 346 U.S. 379 (1953).
27 Jackson v. Choate, 404 F.2d 910, 912 (5th Cir. 1968) (dictum).
28 See cases cited notes 3-5 supra.
29 Lyons v. Davoren, 402 F.2d 890 (1st Cir. 1968).
30 The American Law Institute's draft statute would give the Courts of Appeals power
to review orders denying a request for three judges or dissolving three-judge courts.
STUDY OF THE DIvIsioN OF JURISDICTION BmrwaaEN STATE AND FEDERAL CouRTs § 1376(a), at
46 (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1968).
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to tell us what it is doing. The final step of transferring the mandamus
power to the Courts of Appeals has yet to come, and it will be hard
to reconcile with the statute. One hopes that if that step is taken the
Court will let us know.
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